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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH
WENDELL W. MOTTER and
BETTY F. MOTTER, his wife,
Plaintiffs and Respondents,
vs.
RUSSELL R. BATEMAN and
MYRNA GAYE BATEMAN,
his wife,
Defendants and Appellants.

Case No.
10552

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE
This is an action by
balance due on a written
a business and rental of
action by defendants for
and return of the monies

plaintiffs to recover the
contract for the sale of
a building and counterrecision of the contract
paid thereon.

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The case was tried to a jury. From a verdict
and judgment in favor of the plaintiffs, defendants
appeal.
1

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendants seek a reversal of the judgment
and a new trial.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On August 28, 1961 plaintiffs agreed to sell
and defendants agreed to purchase a business located in St. George, Utah for the sum of $25,000.00
and to rent from the plaintiffs the premises housing
the business for a period of five years at a monthly
rental of $200.00. Defendants executed and delivered to plaintiffs a promissory note in the sum of
$20,000.00 payable at the rate of $200.00 per month,
beginning September 1, 1961 with interest on the
unpaid balance at the rate of 7% per year and
gave a mortgage on nine acres of land owned by
defendants to the plaintiffs to secure the payment
of the promissory note.
Defendants took possession of the business on
September 1, 1961 and continued in possession until
around January 27, 1962. On January 27, 1962
defendants sent a Notice of Recision to plaintiffs
claiming that plaintiffs had made misrepresentations about the business which had induced the defendants to enter into the contract.
Defendants had paid to plaintiffs the sum of
$5,800.00 on the contract of purchase and $800.00
on the rent prior to the time defendants left the
2

premises. Plaintiffs filed the present action on December 27, 1962 to recover the amount of $7,104.43
on the contract of sale; $2,400.00 as unpaid rent
and $2,500.00 as attorney's fees. On February 7,
1964 defendants filed an answer to plaintiff's complaint and counterclaimed for a recision of the
contract and return of $7,056.75 paid to plaintiffs.

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY GIVING THE
FOLLOWING INSTRUCTION NO. 7 "IN DETERMINING WHETHER OR NOT THERE WAS MISREPRESENTATION IN THIS CASE YOU MAY AND SHOULD
CONSIDER WHETHER OR NOT THERE WAS ANY
FALSE OR MISLEADING STATEMENTS MADE BY
THE PLAINTIFF WENDELL MOTTER TO THE DEFENDANTS WITH REGARD TO T HE C 0 S T OR
VALUE OF THE INVENTORY, THE REASON FOR
SELLING THE BUSINESS, THE GROSS VOLUME OF
THE BUSINESS OR THE NET PROFIT WHICH THE
BUSINESS WAS PRODUCING OR HAD PRODUCED.
YOU MAY AND SHOULD CONSIDER WHETHER IN
FACT SUCH STATEMENT OR STATEMENTS WERE
KNOWN TO THE SAID PLAINTIFF WENDELL MOTTER TO BE FALSE AND WHETHER THEY WERE
MADE WITH INTENT THAT THE DEFENDANT
SHOULD RELY THEREON. YOU MAY AND SHOULD
CONSIDER ALSO AS TO WHETHER OR NOT THE
DEFENDANTS DID IN FACT RELY UPON SUCH
STATEMENTS IF THEY WERE FALSE, OR DID MAKE
A SEPARATE AND SPECIAL INVESTIGATION OF
THE MATTER SO AS TO RELY ON OTHER SOURCES
AS DISCLOSED AND UNCOVERED BY SUCH SEPARATE INVESTIGATION. YOU MAY AND SHOULD
3

CONSIDER WHETHER OR NOT THERE WAS IN FACT
ANY DISPARITY WITH RESPECT TO THE INTELLI.
GENCE AND EXPERIENCE OF THE PARTIES IN
THIS MATTER, IF ANY YOU FIND, WHICH WOULD
IN FACT MAKE THE DEFENDANTS MORE SUSCEPTIBLE TO FRAUD THAN THE ORDINARY PRUDENT PERSON," BECAUSE IT DOES NOT EXPLAIN
WHAT EFFECT SUCH DISPARI'TY IN EXPERIENCE
AND INTELLIGENCE BETWEEN THE PARTIES
WOULD MAKE NOR WHAT C 0 N S I D E R A TI 0 N
SHOULD BE GIVEN BY THE JURORS IF IT FOUND
SUCH A DISPARITY THAT WOULD IN FACT MAKE
THE DEFENDANTS MORE SUSCEPTIBLE TO FRAUD
THAN THE ORDINARY PRUDENT PERSON.

Whether or not the jury found such a disparity
with respect to intelligence and experience that made
the defendants more susceptible to fraud than the
ordinary prudent person would be a determining
factor in considering the defendant's right to rely
on the representations of plaintifs or whether the
defendants had a duty to investigate the truthfulness of plaintiff's statements.
In Spiess v. Brandt, (Minn.) 41 NW2d 561, 27
ALR 2d 1 the court stated:
"Where there is great disparity between
the parties, and inexperienced and credulous
vendee has a legal right to rescind a contract
of purchase from the experienced vendors,
who, for the purpose of inducing a sale, r~p
resent that their experience in the operation
of the business being sold resulted in definite
and substantial profits, where such rep~e
sentations are relied upon and actually m4

duce the sale and are found to be false. 23 Am
Jur 841, Fraud and Deceit; 26 CJ pp 1069,
1075; Gaetke v. Ebarr Co. 195 Minn 393 263
NW 448; Dunnell's Dig 3820, 3823, 3828,
note 65, 3833; 23 Am Jur, Fraud and Deceit
p 850, 76; p 857 80; annotation in 50 ALR
436; Gable v. Niles Holding Co. 209 Minn
445, 296 NW 525.

* * * Although the element of disparity
in business experience is not of itself a sufficient ground for relief, nevertheless, the law
does not ignore such disparity, especially
where, as here, the inexperience of youth is
coupled with an added factor of special trust
and confidence growing out of a reasonable
assumption by plaintiffs that a genuine and
close friendship existed between them and defendants. See Gable v. Niles Holding Co. 209
Minn 445, 296 NW 525. On various occasions
when plaintiffs visited the resort to enjoy the
out of doors, defendants had exhibited many
manifestations of friendship. In youth, every
manifestation of friendship seems genuine
and deserving of special trust and confidence.
Disparity may under some circumstances be
a factor of considerable importance when we
keep in mind that the question is not whether
the representation would deceive the average
man. In recision actions for fraud, the question is whether the representations were of
such a character and were made under such
circumstances that they were reasonably calculated to deceive, not the average man, but
a person of the capacity and experience ?f. the
particular individual who was the rec1p1ent
of the representations. Kempf v. Ranger, 182
Minn 64, 155 NW 1059.
5

* * * In cases involving false representations
as to rents, profits, or income, it has been held
that the question whether there is actionable
fraud is determined with respect to the intelligence and experience of the victim of the
fraud rather than by what the effect would
have been on the average person. (Cases Cited
including De Frees v. Carr ( 1893) 8 Utah
488, 33 p 217)
In the present case the defendant Russell Bateman had known the plaintiff Wendell Motter since
1950 or a period of eleven years prior to the transaction. (T 21, L 24 to T 22, L 30) Plaintiff Motter
had been in the electronic business, off and on, in
one form and another, probably 15 years (Depo. of
Wendell Motter, page 2, line 30) had resided in
St. George 30 or 25 years ( T 24, L 11) and had
fixed things for people all his life. ( T 25, L 1). Defendant Russell Bateman had not had any previous
business experience. ( T 7, L 20-25).
In addition to this disparity between the parties as to business there existed a friendly relationship between the parties resulting from plaintiff's
having done a favor to defendant as early as 1950
when plaintiff made possible a telephone-radio conversation between defendant Russell Bateman, then
in Alaska, and his parents, then in St. George. (T
22, L 11 to 17) In addition to this friendly relationship defendant Motter was a very good friend
of defendant's brother. ( T 23, L 4 - 6)
6

The court's failure to explain the effect of such
a disparity between the parties should also be considered in connection with the court's explanation
of Special Interrogatory No. 5 when it said, "So
you will fully understand it, if you find that Mr.
Motter willfully with intention that the defendants
rely on his statements did in fact make false and
fraudulent statements to the defendant and they
did in fact rely on them without an opportunity to
check them or without any reasonable opportunity
to check them, why, then, the determination of the
Court would be for the defendants."
With this statement given to the jurors after
they had requested an explanation of the effect of
their answer to Question No. 5 the jury could not
find for the defendants if it believed the defendants
had an opportunity to check the statements of the
plaintiff or without any reasonable opportunity
to check them.
Even if the defendants had an opportunity to
check the statements of plaintiff, there was no
obligation to do so and the failure to avail themselves of such an opportunity, if it existed, would
not have affected their right to recision of the
contract. The Court said in DeFrees v. Carr (ibid) :

* * * Counsel for defendants contend that the
plaintiff had the opportunity to examine the
books of the company to ascertain its cond~
tion, and satisfy himself as to its responsibility, before the trade was made; but, even
7

if this were the case, it would not license the
defendants to lull the plaintiff into a state
of security by false but apparently reliable
statements of facts, such as are complained
of in this case. The defendant George W. Carr
was manager of the company, and its condition and financial responsibility will be presumed to have been within his knowledge.
He cannot escape from the effects of his statements by saying that the plaintiff could have
ascertained its true condition. Where one
party to a contract misrepresents a material
fact, which operates as a surprise and as an
inducement to the other party, relief will be
granted. * * *."
It should be noted that the jury was divided on
the effect of their answer to Question No. 5 which
was to be answered in the event they answered
Question No. 3 in the affirmative.
Question No. 3 of the Verdict and Answers to
Special Interrogatories was:
"If your answer to question No. 2 is
"Yes", then - Did the plaintiff Wendell W.
Motter, prior to the execution of said documents by the defendants, willfully make any
false representations to the defendants of and
concerning the said business, with intention
that the defendants would rely thereon?"
ANSWER: ····----------------"
Question No. 5 was :
"If your answer to question No. 3 is

"Yes", then - Did the defendants have any
reasonable opportunity to ascertain the truth
8

of and concerning the said business and with
regard to the said representations, if any, of
the plaintiff with regard thereto, prior to
their executing the said documents?"
ANSWER: --------------------·"
Unless the jury had intended to answer Question No. 3 "Yes" there was no need to concern itself with answering Question No. 5. The Court's
failure to explain the legal effect of the disparity
which the jury was instructed to consider in Instruction No. 7, together with the Court's misstatement
of the law applicable in this case to the effect that
if defendants had an opportunity or any reasonable
opportunity to check the statements of plaintiff that
the determination of the court would be for the
plaintiffs, clearly prejudiced the jury and literally
amounted to an instruction to hold for the plaintiffs, inasmuch as there was never a doubt expressed
during the trial as to whether or not the defendant
had some opportunity to investigate the statements
made by the plaintiff Wendell W. Motter.
POINT II.
THE TRIAL COURT'S EXPLANATION AND COMMENTS TO THE JURY UPON THE EFFECT OF THE
JURY'S ANSWER TO QUESTION NO. 5 WAS PREJUDICIAL ERROR AND CONTRARY TO THE LAW
APPLICABLE IN THIS CASE, AND WAS CONTRARY
TO PREVIOUS INSTRUCTIONS GIVEN TO THE JURY.

After deliberating from 5 :40 p.m. until 9 :55
9

p.m. the jury requested the court's explanation on
Question No. 5. The Court stated:
"Well, the Sheriff has handed me this
question which you have written out; and I
quote, "We are divided on Question Number
5. Please explain what effect this will have on
the fallowing questions in regard to the verdict." Is that the question that is bothering
you people?
After Juror Judd (jury foreman) answered,
"Yes", the Court continued:
"I have a copy of the form of verdict in
answer to special interrogatories, and Question Number 5 is this: '''If your answer to
Question Number 2 is yes," and Question
Number 2 refers to the question, "Did the
defendant execute the documents with knowledge of what they were doing and with knowledge of the contents of the documents?" I
assume that you have answered that question
because you then are concerned about Question Number 3. If your answer to Question
Number 2 is yes, "then, did plaintiff, Wendell W. Motter, prior to the execution of the
said documents by the defendants," that
would be before the defendants signed and
executed the documents, "did Mr. Motter willfully, that is, intentionally and with knowledge -" you will recall the instructions of
what willfully meant and that is, not accidentally and unintentionally, make any false
representations to the defendants concerning
the business and with the intention that the
defendants would rely thereon. Now, I think
10

you can find either yes or no, he did make
false statements or he did not. Maybe I am
missing the point of your question. If you
find that he did, why, then, you would answer
the next question : "Did they in fact rely on
his representation." And Number 5: "If you
find that they did rely on it, did they have
reasonable opportunity to ascertain the truth
of and concerning the business with regard
to these representations prior to executing
the documents." If your answer to that is
yes, then, you are down to Number 6, "Did
the defendants in executing the documents
rely on their own observation and investigations of and concerning the business and the
plaintiff's statements with regard thereto
rather than merely on the representations of
plaintiffs." You can answer that yes or no.
Then, of course, Number 7 and Number 8
would be a judgment, would be entered depending on the answer to your previous questions; and the Court would use either Number 7 or Number 8 depending on how you
answered the previous questions. So you will
fully understand it, if you find that Mr. Motter willfully with intention that the defendants rely on his statements did in fact make
false and fraudulent statements to the defendant and they did in fact rely on them
without an opportunity to check them or without any reasonable opportunity to check them,
why, then, the determination of the Court
would be for the defendants.
If, on the other hand, Mr. Motter didn't
make any false statements, or even if he did,
if he didn't make them knowingly or willfully without knowledge of them and made
11

statements that were in fact improper or false
but ~ithout his knowing they were false or
even 1f he knew they were false yet he didn't
make them with the intentions that those
people should rely on them, or if they relied
on something else, their own investigation
why, then, these people had a contract· and
they should be bound to it."
'
It is obvious that Questions 4, 5 and 6 were to
be answered only if the answer to No. 3 was "Yes."
That is, the jury must find that plaintiff Wendell
W. Motter, prior to the execution of said documents
by the Defendants, willfully made some false representations to the defendants of and concerning
the said business, with intent that the defendants
would rely thereon, before they were to answer
with respect to defendant's actual reliance thereon
(Question No. 4) or whether defendants had any
reasonable opportunity to check the statements of
the plain tiff (Question No. 5) or whether the defendants relied on their own observations and investigations rather than merely on the representations of the plaintiffs. (Question No. 6)

With respect to the Questions to be answered
and the verdict the jury was instructed by the court
as follows: (Pleadings 51)
Instead of finding generally in favor of
the plaintiff or the defendant, you are dire~t
ed to answer the questions which are submitted to you and thereby determi~e the facts
at issue in this case. The Court will apply the
12

law to the facts and enter judgment in accordance therewith. * * *.
The form of the Verdict and Answers to Special Interrogatories did not provide for the jury to
make a determination as to the validity or invalidity of the contract between the parties nor did
it provide for a general verdict in favor of either
party.
Question 7 was :
Assuming the documents executed by and
between the parties to be in full force and
effect, what amount exclusive of interest is
due and owing from the defendants to the
plaintiffs,
(a) For the sales of the business?
( b)

$--------------------

For the rental of the buildings?
$--------------------

Question 8 was:
Assuming the documents executed by and
between the parties to be null and void, what
amount exclusive of interest is due and owing from the plaintiffs to the defendants?
ANSWER: $------------------------·
The jury answered No. 7 but ignored No. 8.
The Court's statement at the 9 :55 p.m. session to
the jury that its determination would be for the
defendants if the jury found that Motter willfully
with intention that the defendants rely on his statements did in fact make false and fraudulent state13

ments to the defendant and they did in fact rely on
them without an opportunity to check them or without any reasonable opportunity to check them constituted an error which was prejudicial to the defendants. Except for the court's statement and explanation the jury could have answered all of the
applicable Questions (including both Questions 7
and 8) and the facts having then been determined
the Court could have applied the law and entered
judgment accordingly. As Question 5 was to be
answered only if Question Number 3 was answered
"Yes" the fact that the jury was divided on Question Number 5 and wanted to know what legal effect it would have on the following questions and the
verdict makes it obvious that prior to the Court's
explanation the jury's answer to Question No. 5
was "Yes." After the Court's explanation the jury
again retired to continue their deliberations and
within ten minutes had returned to the courtroom
with Question Number 3 answered, "No", and Questions 4, 5, 6 and 8 disregarded. Clearly the court's
comments were prejudicial to the defendants and
affected the outcome of this case.
By way of further explanation to the jury in
answer to their query regarding Question Number
5, the Court stated:
If on the other hand, Mr. Motter didn't
make ~ny false statements, ~r even if ~e did,
if he didn't make them knowingly or willfully
without full knowledge of them and made
14

th3:t were in fact improper or false
but ":ithout his knowing they were false or
even if he knew they were false yet he didn't
make them with the intentions that those
people should rely on them, or if they didn't
actuallr rely on them, that they relied on
somethmg else, their own investigation, why,
then, these people had a contract· and they
should be bound to it."
'
staten~ents

This statement was not only confusing but was
an incorrect statement of the law applicable in this
case and the comment to the effect that if the defendants didn't actually rely on the false statements
of the plaintiff, but relied on something else, their
own investigation, then, they had a contract and
should be bound by it was prejudicial to defendants
side of the case.
Prior to the 9 :55 p.m. session the jury could have
found that even if defendants had a reasonable opportunity to investigate the truthfulness of plaintiff's statements they may have been thwarted in
so doing and still been entitled to recover. By Instruction No. 3 and No. 4 the Court explained that
before the plaintiffs would be precluded from recovery the jury would have to find that the defendants had no reasonable opportunity to determine the
truthfulness or falsity of the alleged misrepresentations, or although the defendants had a reasonable
opportunity to determine the truth or falsity of the
alleged misrepresentations the defendants were
thwarted by actions or devices of the plaintiffs so
15

as to prevent such discovery. (Instructions 3 and 4)
During the 9 :55 p.m. session the Court failed tu
mention that even if the defendants had an opportunity to ascertain the truth that they may have been
thwarted in their efforts to do so and if such were
the case that they still could have been entitled to
recovery.
Defendant Russell Bateman testified: ( T 135,
L 22 - 30)
"The fact it was actually suggested by
Wendell that I go over and look at the books
but he had mentioned it probably wouldn't re~
veal too much to me, not to take too much interest; and, then, he would go on to say the
real value, as you can see, "what I am getting out of this, I have got this store free and
clear and got my home in Pine Valley and
I have got my home here in town free and
clear." He said those are the thing you really
need to look at."
In answer to the question, "Now, what did
he (Motter) say with respect to your examining all
of the books that Dexter Snow had?", Bateman
testified:
He mentioned that the books were a necessary evil and you had to supply so much information for tax purposes and so forth; ~ut
he said that the stock and the merchandise
and the income he had far exceeded what was
shown on the books."
From such testimony the jury could easily have
found that although the defendants had an oppor16

tunity to check the records that they were thwarted
or discouraged in their efforts to do so and if that
were the case that their failure to do so would not
prevent them from recovery.
POINT III.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO
GIVE DEFENDANT'S PROPOSED INSTRUCTION NO.
8 - "A PURCHASER MAY BE EXCUSED FROM MAKING A THOROUGH INSPECTION OR INVESTIGATION WHEN HE BELIEVES AND RELIES ON THE
VENDOR'S STATEMENTS. A VENDOR WHO MAKES
FALSE STATEMENTS INDUCING ANOTHER TO
BUY PROPERTY WILL NOT BE ALLOWED TO CONTEND THAT BY ORDINARY DILIGENCE AND INQUIRY, THE PURCHASER COULD HAVE LEARNED
THE TRUTH.
THE FACT THAT THE PURCHASER WAS WITHOUT KNOWLEDGE OF THE TRUTH CONCERNING
THE MATTER ABOUT WHICH THE REPRESENTATION WAS MADE JUSTIFIES HIS BELIEF IN AND
RELIANCE ON IT."

The proposed instruction was necessary to properly inform the jury of the law with respect to the
defendant's right to rely on the statements made by
plaintiff with respect to the business and unless the
jury were properly informed on the law they could
not render a correct verdict.
It is stated in 23 American Jurisprudence
Fraud & Deceit § 158, pp 965-966.
Referring a representee to the sources _of
the speaker's information doe~ n?t. necessarily
relieve the representor from habih~y f?r false
statements, since the representee s right to
17

r~ly on such statement~ withou~ an investiga.
~ion of the s01.~rces of information mentioned

is not necessarily destroyed by such reference

* * *

)

. J\ representor. cannot escape liability for
his m1sre:presei:tation by advising the representee to investigate and to satisfy himself as
to the property before acquiring it. (Annotation 61 A.L.R. 515)

* * *
It is well settled that a representee has a

right to rely upon representations where a
confidential relationship exists between the
parties. In such cases a high degree of frankness and fair dealing is required, and the representee cannot be charged with lack of diligence in failing to make an independent investigation, either at the time or afterward.
Similarly, where, by reason of the representor's superior knowledge or experience with
respect to the thing dealt with or because of
relations of friendship or trust existing between the parties, the represen tee expressly
relies upon the honesty of the representor and
the latter's representations as to the subject
matter, without attempting to ascertain the
truth of the representations, the representor
is bound to act honorably and deal fairly with
the representee and is generally held liable
for fraud or misrepresentations, although the
representee might have ascertained the facts
by an independent investigation. * * *.
The fact that the party to whom representations are made may have discovered the
truth by investigation is immaterial w~ere .he
is fraudulently induced to forego makmg m18

quiries or investigations in whole or in part
which he otherwise wo~ld make where th~
representations are of such a cha~acter or are
made. in sue~ ~ way as t~ disarm his vigilance,
lull his susp1c10ns, and mduce him to refrain
from making such inquiries or examinations. * * *.

* * *

Unusual difficulty in examining, or in
securing information concerning, the property commercially dealt with has in various
situations been held to warrant justification
in reliance upon representations as to such
property without an investigation. The principle has been applied to transactions involving such personalty as a stock of goods or
other property consisting of numerous items.
(Annotation 61 A.L.R. 528 et seq)
Thus, the purchaser of a stock of merchandise has been held to have the right to
rely upon the seller's fraudulent misrepresentations of these matters, although, he could
have examined the whole stock and discovered
the falsity of the representations. * * *
POINT IV.
THE JURY VERDICT IS CONTRARY TO LAW
AND TO THE EVIDENCE AND TESTIMONY PRODUCED AT THE TRIAL.

The jury was not requested to render a general
verdict but rather to answer the questions submitted by the Court and determine the facts at
issue in the case. (First page of Instructions to
the Jury or page 51 of the Pleadings) Instead of
19

answering all of the questions applicable the jury
rendered what amounted to a general verdict and
ignored Question No. 8. From the form of the Verdict and Answers to Special Interrogatories it is
difficult to determine how the jury's answer to
Question No. 7 became the general verdict and the
answers to the parts of that question became the
amount of the judgment. Question No. 7 was:
"Assuming the documents executed by
and between the parties to be in full force and
effect, what amount exclusive of interest is
due and owing from the defendants to the
plaintiffs.
(a) For the sale of the business?
$. ------------------( b) For the rental of the building?
$--------------------"

The jury's answer for part (a) was: $7,104.43
and for part (b) was $2,400.00, and Judgment on
Verdict for said amounts was entered accordingly.
The Question was based upon an assumption and the
answer of the jury was to assist the Court by determining the facts. The Court would apply the law
thereto and render a judgment thereon.
Question No. 8 was:
Assuming the documents executed by and
between the parties to be null and void, what
amount exclusive of interest is due and owing from the plaintiffs to the defendants?
ANSWER: $--------------------·"
This question was not answered by the jury.
Inasmuch as it was based upon an assumption, as
20

was No. 7, it should have been answered by the jury
and the Court should have rendered the general verdict either for the plaintiffs or the defendants.
After the jury had submitted its answers to
the special interrogatories and had been dismissed
defendant's attorney moved the Court to set aside
the verdict of the jury and grant a judgment of
no cause of action as against the plaintiffs notwithstanding the verdict and the answers to the special
interrogatories rendered by the jury. The motion
\vas taken under advisement and as yet has not been
ruled upon. (T 180 and T 181)
That the Judgment on Verdict is contrary to
the law applicable in this case is the fact that it
would constitute unjust enrichment to the plaintiffs
and a harsh penalty to the defendants, if allowed to
stand. As pointed out to the trial judge when the
motion was made for judgment notwithstanding the
verdict the defendants had already paid to the plaintiffs the sum of more than $7,000 for a period of
five months possession of the property. Exhibit D-4
shows total payments from defendants to plaintiffs
of $7,056. 75. Defendant Russell Bateman testified
that he had invested approximately $14,000.00 in
the business including the $7,056 he paid the plaintiffs. (T 154, L 9-12) Defendants made improvements to the building which plaintiff Wendell Motter stated were good except for the timing. (T 69,
L 6-30). Defendants payment to plaintiffs of
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$7,056.75 and the improvements to plaintiff's building constitute sufficient penalty to have to pay for
a first business venture. An additional judgment of
$11,796.73 or for any amount against the defendants would constitute a harsh and cruel punishment
and would not only amount to an unjust forfeiture
but would result in an unjust enrichment of the
plaintiffs.
CONCLUSION
Appellants submit that from the foregoing it
is evident that the lower court erred in failing to
correctly instruct the jury on the law applicable
to the case; in not requiring the jury to follow the
court's instructions; in failing to correctly explain
Question No. 5 at the 9 :55 P.M. session; in allowing the Jury's answer to Question No. 7 to constitute a general verdict; in not rendering a general
verdict itself; in requiring the jury to assume the
validity of the con tract between the parties and in
not ruling upon defendant's motion for judgment
notwithstanding the verdict and answers to special
interrogatories by the jury.
The verdict judgment should be set aside and
the cause remanded for a new trial.
Respectfully submitted,
MAXWELL BENLEY
412 Kearns Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorney for Appellants
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